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RECENT DECISIONS
The Commission has broad powers and a wide extent of administrative discretion but it is fundamental that the powers of the Commission are subject to circumscription by legislative enactments and
constitutional rights. It is a fundamental requirement that opportunity for a fair hearing must be provided by the Commission in the
discharge of its duties.' Lacking this, an order of the Commission
will be in violation of the due process clause.2 Moreover, an edict of
the Commission may be set aside as arbitrary and unreasonable in3
the light of the general intendment of the legislative requirements.
Assuredly, in view of the present economic conditions existing in the
country and in view of the financial situation of the railroads, the
order of the Commission, based on facts existent in 1928, requiring
the lowering of rates is unreasonable and arbitrary. No opportunity
for a fair hearing on the basis of a record reflecting the present conditions has been given. The difference between conditions in 1931
and in 1928 is not a matter of a slight fluctuation in business conditions but is the result of the advent of a new economic level. The
allegation that the general business level has drastically declined needs
no proof. The change is the outstanding contemporary fact, dominating thought and action throughout the country. Since it is a fact
of common everyday knowledge which admittedly everyone within
this country can be presumed to know, the court will take judicial
notice of the present economic situation; it would not be good sense to
do otherwise.4 Stripped of its technical grounding in the rules of
administrative and constitutional law, the decision is one which has
for its motivating power a degree of common sense which seems to
be an attribute peculiar to the members of the United States Supreme
Court.
E. P. W.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-REQUIREMENT OF FINDING OF PUBLIC
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FACILITIES AS PREREQUISITE TO LICENSE TO
ENGAGE IN ICE BUSINEs.-Plaintiff, engaged in the manufacture,

sale, and distribution of ice in Oklahoma City under a license of the
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, brought a bill in the United
States District Court to enjoin defendant from engaging in the same
I Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 186 (1913).

v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369, 50 Sup. Ct. 299, 302 (1930).
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 215 U. S.
452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155 (1910) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108 (1912).
"McKELVEY, EVIDENCE (1924) §12. "The doctrine of judicial notice is
that there are certain facts of which the courts will not require evidence,
because they are so well known, so easily ascertainable or so related to the
official character of the court, that it would not be good sense to do so."
2 Dohany
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business in Oklahoma City without first obtaining a license from the
Corporation Commission. Statute' provided that the manufacture,
sale and distribution of ice was a public business; that no one could
engage in it without first obtaining a license from the Commission;
and that if upon the hearing on the application it appeared that
facilities for furnishing ice already existed in the locality in which
the applicant wished to do business, sufficient to meet the public needs
therein, the Commission could refuse the application. Defendant
had not applied for a license. The District Court dismissed the bill;
on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed. On appeal,
held, affirmed.

The business is an ordinary one and " * * * bears

no such relation to the public as to warrant its inclusion in the category of businesses charged with a public use, * * * " and the regula-

tion is one " * * * denying or unreasonably curtailing the common
right to engage in a lawful private business. * * *" New State Ice

Company v. Lie mann, U. S. Daily, March 22, 23, 24, 1932, at 128,
129; 137, 139; 144, 145. (Decided March 21, 1932.)
The requirement of the existence of a "public interest" in a
business as a condition to state regulation of its affairs, growing out
of the rate making cases, 2 tends to obscure the conditions upon
which the state can exercise a more general but less drastic regulatory
power. The purpose of the instant statute is evidently to secure a
reasonable price and an equitable distribution of the commodity to
consumers by preventing wasteful duplication of facilities and ruinous
competition.3 The method is partial exclusion from what before the
enactment was a common calling 4-the fostering of regulated quasimonopolies. This was accomplished at least once without reference
to the "public interest" doctrine, in the interest of public health. 5 But
the present statute invited application of the "public interest" test by
SOKLA. ComP. STAT. ANx. (Bunn Supp. 1926) §6619.
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876) ; Budd v. New York,
143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468 (1892) ; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391,
14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389,
34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914); Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426
(1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928); Williams
v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929); cf. Standard Oil
Co. v. City of Lincoln, 275 U. S. 504, 48 Sup. Ct. 155 (1927), tff'g, 114 Neb.
243 (1926) ; see Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S.
522, 535, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 632 (1923); Finkelstein, From Mum v. Illinois to
Tyson v. Banton, A Study in JudicialProcess (1927) COL. L. REv. 769, 774, 777.
' See Cap F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities, 180 Ark. 770, 772,
22 S. W. (2d) 993, 994 (1929), 68 A. L. R. 1018 (1930).
'The right to engage in the common callings has latterly been closely
protected. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915); Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662 (1917) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923); see Butchers Union v. Crescent City, 111 U. S.
746, 757, 762, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 657, 660 (1884); cf. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18
Wall. 129 (1873); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (1887);
Warren, The New Liberty Under the 14th Amnendent (1926) 39 HARv. L.
Rtv. 431, 445, 454.
The Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).

RECENT DECISIONS
its phrasing, 6 its resemblance to the "certificate of public convenience8
and necessity" cases, 7 and the severity of its method of regulation.
Yet the factual situation, elaborately examined by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion, might justify the conclusion that "the
indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and
arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected without
regulation" 9 created a public interest, calling for regulation which
would be valid if it "bore a substantial relation to the evils found to
exist." 10 Perhaps a more liberal attitude toward the legislative 11
and administrative 12 judgment on these points might have been
indulged. But the "propriety of deferring a good deal to the tribunals on the spot" 13 is not so keenly felt when the business, prima
facie, seems almost certainly not public and the mode of regulation is
so closely akin to one applicable to public utilities, operating under
grants of special powers, in which the state has, consequently, a
peculiarly paternal interest. The avoidance of duplication of facilities
in the utility cases is, in a measure at least, rather incidental to the
withholding of necessary special privileges than an end in itself. Of
course, the required public interest could not be created by legislative
pronouncement, thrusting public duties upon an inherently private
aThe statute, supra note 1, in sub-section 1, declares the ice business a
"public business"; sub-sections 3 and 5 give the Commission power to require
the licensee to afford its facilities and services to the public, and the same power
to fix "the rates, rules, charges and regulations" of the licensee that it has in
relation to transportation and transmission companies. Appellant "relied" on
Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (1929), in
which under a similar statute applicable to cotton ginning, it was assumed that
the business was public and the license to engage in it held, for the purposes of
that case, a special franchise. Corporation Commission v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431,
50 Sup. Ct. 397 (1930) involved a similar assumption in regard to the same
statute.
' Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926);
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582 (1931); cf. Stephenson v.
Binford, 53 F. (2d) 509 (S. D. Tex. 1931), noted (1932) 45 HRV. L. REv. 583.
" Cap F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities Co., supra note 3, held
under a similar statute that, though the business was affected with a public
interest, and was amenable to rate regulation, a similar licensing feature was
unconstitutional.
"Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 2 at 538,
43 Sup. Ct. at 634.
" Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the instant case.
' See McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547, 548, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 208
(1909) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569, 31 Sup.
Ct. 259, 263 (1911) ; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 385, 36 Sup. Ct. 379, 384
(1916); O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 257,
51 Sup. Ct. 130, 132 (1931) ; and Finkelstein, op cit. supra note 2 at 782.
' The Corporation Commission had several times requested specific legislation on the ice question after some years' experience at regulating the industry
under a general statute [OKLA. COmp. STAT. ANN. (Bunn 1921) §11032] giving
it broad powers over businesses found to be "virtual monopolies." Oklahoma
Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. 19, 220 Pac. 54 (1923).
"Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 365, 30 Sup. Ct.
301, 302 (1910).
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business. 14 To seek to sustain the statute, now seven years old, as
emergency legislation against the depression 15 would be to exaggerate
the emergency and overestimate the remedy. 16 It hardly goes to the
root of the difficulty. At all events Lord Hale's phrase,'7 "the worn
touchstone of constitutionality," still serves to "prevent the making of
social experiments * * * in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several states," 18 when an.unsympathetic court judicially reviews the
exercise of legislative discretion.' 9

J. F. D.,

JR.

EQUITY-CONSTRUCTION OF TERM "SALE" IN LEASE AND
BOND.-Plaintiffs deposited stocks and money as collateral security
with the defendant indemnity company which was surety on a bond
given by the plaintiffs to secure the faithful performance of a lease.
The lease and bond contained provisions that if the lessor sold the
leased property the bond should be cancelled, provided the plaintiffs
had faithfully performed up to that time. The lessor died during the
term of the lease, and the property passed under his will to his
children, who formed a corporation of which they were the sole
stockholders and to which they transferred the property, receiving
in return the corporate stock and bonds in equal shares. No money
consideration or price was involved. Plaintiffs had fully performed
up to the time that the property was transferred to the corporation.
"Michigan

Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup.

Ct. 191 (1925) ; Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605

(1926) ; see Producers Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S.
228, 230, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 132 (1920). But see Adler, Business Jurisprudence
(1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 135, 146 et seq. for a discussion of the historical
impossibility of "privacy" in a business.
" As suggested by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion.
" The statute seems, too, to lack the temporary quality of the approved
emergency statutes. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct.
405 (1924) ; see Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 460 (1921)
("The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure") ; Wilson
v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 345, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 301 (1916).
" See McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 759, for the origin of the phrase and much of its
later history; and Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 1089, 1095, for the manner of its adoption by Mr. Chief Justice Waite
in Munn v. Illinois.
'Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 134 (1921).
"See McClain, The Convenience of the Public Interest Concept (1931)
15 Mim~r. L. REv. 546, 557, suggesting that if, as was said in Wolff Packing
Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, stpra note 2 at 539, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634,
kinds of public interest and degrees of regulation are admissible under the
doctrine, then a finding of some public interest adds little to the solution of the
problem and leaves the particular regulation still to be justified on the general
principles governing exercise of the police power.

